Neopragmatic thought and counseling values: reconsidering the role of values in counseling from an alternative epistemological foundation.(Essay)

The history of Western philosophical thought has been dominated by the search for transcendent truth. As a consequence of this history, various epistemological dualisms (such as fact/value and appearance/reality) have come to structure modes of inquiry. Reliance on such dualisms has resulted in a degradation of values discourse, which, along with other "soft" forms of inquiry, is often viewed as epistemologically inferior to the "hard" sciences. However, particularly within the last century, philosophers have proposed compelling challenges to these dualisms, which, in turn, have massive implications for values discourse. These challenges are overviewed, and implications for values discourse within the counseling profession are discussed.

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Western philosophical thought has a fascinating and complex history, with a varied array of thinkers, intriguing questions, and novel resolutions to problems that appeared irresolvable when first proposed (Popkin, 1999). Although this history is composed of incredibly diverse elements, the search for truth has been a common objective to virtually all schools of philosophy, at least until the late 19th century (Anderson, 1990; Hansen, 2007a; Rorty, 1999). This goal of finding truth is rooted in ancient Greek philosophy and was further endorsed during the Enlightenment.

The Enlightenment philosopher Descartes proposed a metaphysical model consisting of the immaterial mind and the material world (Custance & Travis, 1980; Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 2002). This dualistic framework fortified the ancient Greek charge to know truth and positioned the scientific method as the epistemological means to discover it (Fishman, 1999). Science, then, became idealized as the route to truth and alternative enterprises, such as the exploration of values, were relegated to the status of hopelessly subjective, second-class ventures that could never achieve the same epistemological standing as the hard sciences (Anderson, 1990; Hicks, 2004).

This idealization of science with its concomitant degradation of values discourse, however, is dependent upon the epistemological dualism that was established by the ancient Greek and Enlightenment philosophers. This dualism is that inquiry can result in either conclusions that correspond to transcendent truth or positions that do not (Rorty, 1979). This true/not-true dualism also spawned other epistemological binaries, such as fact/value (Putnam, 1997) and appearance/reality (Rorty, 1998). If these various dualisms were dissolved or demonstrated to be arbitrary, however, the foundation of values discourse within the counseling profession would be radically altered.

Over the past century, philosophers, particularly those from the pragmatic camps (e.g., Dewey, 1997; James, 1997; Peirce, 1997) and neopragmatic camps (e.g., Putnam, 1997; Rorty, 1979), have provided cogent challenges to these epistemological dualisms that have structured philosophical discourse for thousands of years. The collapse of these dualisms has tremendous implications for the role of values in the counseling profession. Therefore, the goals of this article are to overview particular epistemological dualisms, review critiques of these dualisms, and discuss the role of values within the counseling profession from an alternative, neopragmatic framework. These goals shall be accomplished within the following organizational structure: (a) True/Not-True Dualism, (b) Fact/Value Dualism, (c) Appearance/Reality Dualism, and (d) Discussion and Conclusions.

True/Not-True Dualism