Iran: religious leaders and opposition movements.(ANDREW WELLINGTON CORDIER ESSAY)(Essay)

In many parts of the world, religious leaders have historically played a pivotal role during periods of social and political transition. (1) Their presence on the political scene has been particularly significant in societies where religion is closely intertwined with cultural, social and economic life. Iran is an example of such a society and its religious leaders, the ulama, have always been a visible force in political and social life. (2) An examination of the ulama's role in three key 20th century opposition movements in Iran sheds light on their potential role as agents of change in the post-revolutionary political structure. The opposition movements in question are the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 to 1911, the Oil Nationalization movement in the early 1950s and the Revolution of 1979. These movements shared the common purpose of reducing the power of the monarchy and, in each instance, the movement's power was derived from three significant social groups: the ulama, the merchants of the bazaar (bazaaris), and the intelligentsia. (3) Religious leaders usually had a more substantial and effective role than the other groups mainly because of their ability to mobilize large segments of the population.

Motivated primarily by class interests, the ulama were able to effectively mobilize the population and, therefore, play a decisive role in the processes and the outcomes of major opposition movements in the 20th century Their powerful position was reinforced by a variety of factors, the most important of which were financial independence, an extensive and dependable system of communication, and the unwavering trust of the populace. However, the post-revolutionary transformation of the ulama from a social class stirring against the ruling regime to one closely associated with the central government has taken away these traditional sources of power and the ulama's influential position among the populace has greatly deteriorated.

The roots of the ulama's power can be traced back to the Safavid dynasty, which declared Shia Islam as the official religion of Iran in 1501. The Safavids managed to unify Iran after several centuries. During this same period, the Ottomans, who were Sunnis, unified the rest of the Middle East. This sequence of events interwove Shiism into the "independent political existence of the 'soil of Iran.'" (4) Not only did the government coerce its subjects into converting to Shiism, it also allotted significant funds for the establishment of religious institutions. These included the madrasa system and, most significantly, a network for the collection of religious dues, comprised largely of khoms (one-fifth of annual profit surplus). (5) This infrastructure worked to maintain Shiism as the dominant religion in Iran for centuries to come and allowed the ulama to develop a strong social network throughout the country

The network for collecting religious dues grew over time and sustained the economy of the Shia religious establishment in Iran, allowing it to remain independent of the central government. (6) Later on, especially during the 19th and 20th centuries, this independence resulted in the ulama's ability to present a viable opposition to the ruling regime. This network also created revenue for religious schools and other institutions while providing a space for ulama to establish connections with communities across Iran. Its structure was hierarchical, ranging from the grand Ayatollah at the top to the minor clerics operating in small towns and villages, and it was used to channel revenues up the system and trickle messages down to the people. (7)

Over time, a strong link developed between the ulama, as the custodians of the religio-economic network, and the bazaar, who were the major contributors of religious dues. A bazaari whose religious dues were paid regularly and in abundance while observing minimum Islamic codes of behavior, was naturally granted approval by the ulama and was considered a credible businessman. Thus, the relationship benefited both sides: while the ulama depended on contributions from bazaar merchants, the bazaar merchants were increasingly dependent on the Mama for credibility in the business world. (8)

The true power of this network was first revealed during the Tobacco Rebellion of 1890 to 1892. This was a popular movement that opposed a substantial concession granted to the British Major Gerald Talbot. This concession gave Talbot full rights over the production, domestic sales and export of tobacco to the great disadvantage of the bazaaris. (9) Outraged by this move, the bazaaris sought support from the ulama, who in turn employed their religious network as a tool for political mobilization. Despite facing an underdeveloped communications system, the ulama were able to use mosques and heyats to spread their message throughout the country in a matter of days. (10) The ensuing public pressure forced Naser-al-Din Shah to cancel the concession and forego the financial gains that he expected to reap from the deal. In the following years, this network was employed to mobilize the population for, as well as against various opposition movements.

Further contributing to the strength of this network was the fact that the ulama, at least those in the lower levels of the hierarchy, had extremely close ties with the populace, who in turn placed a great deal of trust in them. For a large segment of the population, the words of the ulama were considered divine. Not only a point of reference in regards to religious matters, they were also the arbiters of disputes, family mediators, notaries and business consultants.

While their aims diverged somewhat, the ulama was also able to establish ties with the intelligentsia. Exposed to Western history, the intelligentsia was convinced that human progress was not only possible but also easily attainable if they broke, as Abrahamian puts it, the three chains of royal despotism, clerical…