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"It is well said," Poe says "of a certain German book that 'er lasst sich nicht
lesen'--it does not permit itself to be read."(1) The figures in Beckett's Watt, as they move "slowly alone, like something out of Poe," move in a text that seems to prohibit certain kinds of reading.(2) Hugh Kenner has noted that Watt's strangely crafted isolated elements resist pattern-finding and allegorization.(3) Yet Kenner also notes that Beckett, far from presenting the reader with mute opacity, has laced the work with mannerisms and mechanisms that tempt us to struggle against this resistance: "The book repeatedly drives us to seek after patterns"; "The temptation to allegorize it is . . . strong." H. Porter Abbott locates Beckett's achievement in the "mock allegory" Watt obliges the dutiful reader to investigate.(4) I will argue that a complementary model for Watt's interpretive tension emerges as we investigate how Beckett uses the writings of the German-trained Scottish psychologist Henry Jackson Watt. H. J. Watt, once his spectre is raised, furnishes the reader with ample new opportunities to read Beckett, ample new temptations to misread Beckett.
Jacques Lacan uses Poe's story, "The Purloined Letter," in part to argue that those before him have misread Freud. Today Lacan is often read, and no doubt misread, for his suggestions on how to read. One reading of Lacan indicates Lacan re-reads Freud in an attempt to recover the true radicalness of Freud's interpretive strategy, a strategy beyond signification. Freud, according to Lacan (as Shoshana Felman usefully represents him), dealt primarily with the path of the signifier, not the signified.(5) In discussing "The Case of Poe," Felman concludes that "what poetry and psychoanalysis have in common" is that "they both exist only insofar as they resist our reading."(6) The revolutionary nature of Freud's discovery, for Lacan, "consists not--as it is conventionally understood--of the revelation of a new meaning but of the practical discovery of a new way of reading."(7)
The interpretive strategy propounded by H. J. Watt springs from his mistrust of what had been "conventionally understood" to be "Freud's discovery." Though it would be foolish to ascribe all the subtlety of Lacanian thought to Watt, Lacan and Watt have a common ground based on an irony of misreading. Watt and Lacan agree that a certain type of reading strategy is flawed: for Lacan, in terms of Poe's story, the analyst's mistake lies in the attempt to divine the hidden contents of the purloined letter. Ironically, the shared aversion to such a subcutaneous reading project leads Watt to criticize Freud, but leads Lacan to defend Freud. Watt accuses Freud of the sin that Lacan believes Freud never committed (Lacan attributes the transgression solely to Freud's errant followers), namely, attempting to look beneath the signifier. In The Common Sense of Dreams, Watt seeks to free the analyst from what Watt sees as Freud's error:(8)
We now see that we can dispense with a number of the notions applied to dreams by Freud and others . . . as scientific terms for these relations, which would imply that the conflict took some means of changing itself into the images and thoughts of the dream, so that while not actually apparent it might be virtually present, they are utterly misleading and perverse. One of these terms is symbolism. (CSD, 145)