Losing in Lebanon.(AT WAR)

As an illustration of Clausewitz's famous axiom that war is a continuation of politics by other means, the Israel-Hezbollah conflict is almost ideal. Hezbollah wants to stay on Israel's northern border, toward the ultimate goal of wiping Israel off the map. Israel wants Hezbollah pushed off the border, toward the ultimate goal of eliminating it as an armed militia. These obviously are irreconcilable goals. And when the struggle to advance them moves from the battlefield to the diplomatic arena, they remain just as irreconcilable.

As soon as the U.S. and France agreed on a proposed ceasefire resolution at the United Nations, Hezbollah, the Lebanese government, and the Arab League nixed it. The draft called for a ceasefire from Hezbollah and an end to Israeli "offensive" operations, while the Israelis would hold southern Lebanon until a robust international force could be deployed there as stipulated by a second U.N. resolution. The Lebanese and the Arab League object to Israel's staying in Lebanon and want it to hand over the south to a Lebanese army and a slightly larger U.N. force immediately.

This might seem a mere matter of sequencing, but it's not. It is the central issue in the war. If Israel leaves immediately, Hezbollah will be right back on its northern border. Arabs complained that the proposed U.S.-French resolution handed the Israelis their military objective by diplomatic means. That it did, which is why it was so desirable, and why America's ability to get the French to sign off on it--if only temporarily--was such an impressive feat of negotiation. For the first time in history, the U.N. would have intervened in the midst of an Israeli-Arab war in effect to help the Israeli side.

Because here's the rub: In the first three weeks of the war, Israel did not weaken Hezbollah ...