Paradoxical outcomes of national schooling in the borderland of West Kalimantan, Indonesia: the case of the Iban.

Introduction

Marginal populations like the borderland Iban often do not primarily identify with the state in which they live. Identities derived from regional and local associations are usually more significant in people's daily experience. Communities living on either side of a national border, for instance, may have more in common with each other than they do with their own distant state capitals or other regions of their country. Such absence of a sense of strong national belonging is evident among the Kalimantan Iban, influences their relationship with the Indonesian state, and in many ways challenges the nation-state's more homogeneous definition of what makes a nationality distinctive.

This paper brings together facets of national belonging and national schooling within a borderland context with the aim of understanding the often shifting and ambiguous relationship between the border Iban and their nation-state.

Mass-education in Indonesia is of fairly recent origin and has been an important instrument in the nation-building process. In this paper, I will argue that processes of national schooling are often more complex and seldom turn out as intended by national policy-makers. In the area studied national schooling has been only partially successful in creating identification with Indonesia due to certain socio-economic constraints and the local border peoples' long history of cross-border relations.

The data analyzed here is based on field research conducted among Iban border communities in the subdistrict (kecamatan) of Batang Lupar, district (kabupaten) of Kapuas Hulu in West Kalimantan during eight months between 2002 and 2003, with one month of additional observations in 2005. (1) The primary location of field research was the longhouse community of Rumah Manah and surrounding communities located along the Leboyan River. (2) The longhouse of Rumah Manah is divided into ten nuclear bilik-families, which at the time of my field research, consisted of 84 persons, although the number of residents varied considerably throughout the year, and some months the actual population living there was much smaller. There are several reasons for this; first, many residents (especially young men) spent a certain amount of time every year working in Sarawak, Malaysia. The older school children stayed most of the year in boarding schools in the subdistrict capital, Lanjak, only visiting the longhouse on weekends and holidays.

The Borderland

The Iban number over 600,000 in the Malaysian state of Sarawak, where they make up slightly more than a quarter of the state's population, while smaller Iban groups live in Sabah, the Sultanate of Brunei, and along the international border in the Indonesian province of West Kalimantan (cf. Sather 2004:623). About 14,000 Iban live in West Kalimantan. While in Sarawak, the Iban make up the largest single ethnic group, over the border in the province of West Kalimantan, the Iban are a small minority. (3) Being a major group or a minority, as I will show, has certain implications, which shape the groups differently.

A large majority of the Iban in the subdistrict Batang Lupar practice longhouse residence, with the economic foundation based on subsistence agriculture and forestry with its fundamental component being rice farming in hill or swamp swiddens. As a supplement to rice fanning, the Iban engage in hunting, fishing, and collect different kinds of forest products. To further supplement the household economy, be able to buy sought-after consumer goods, and pay for children's schooling, people engage in different kinds of wage labor, both locally and across the border in Sarawak.

The expansion of economic development in the Batang Lupar subdistrict has been made difficult by its relative isolation from the rest of the province, a result of poor or non-existent infrastructure. In order to get economic development going, the government began constructing roads connecting the border region (kawasan perbatasan) with the rest of the province. (4) The slowly improving infrastructure along with an increase in logging have recently brought about new economic possibilities (Wadley and Eilenberg 2005, 2006). A new road network has cut down on traveling time, both when going to town to sell cash-crops, buy consumer goods, attend school, visit government offices and clinics and when crossing the border to work or visit family in Sarawak.

Borderland Habitus

Transnational borderlands, as the West Kalimantan borderland, generate opportunities for adopting specific socio-economic strategies, which depend on local ability to move between and make use of multiple identities. Living in a borderland between two different nation-states confronts the local border population with a sense of duality. These ambiguous circumstances of border life shape a certain border habitus, which often is in conflict with the national view of being good and loyal citizens. The duality of borderlands is very much apparent among the West Kalimantan Iban studied, Iban identity may be seen as consisting of (at least) two parts: first, being an ethnic Iban and culturally connected to a large Iban population in neighboring Sarawak, Malaysia, and second, being a longtime resident in the border area at the margins of the Indonesian state. Identity is a critically important factor in local Iban perceptions and strategic decisions. For the Iban borderlanders, belonging to a specific ethnicity is the prime identity marker when dealing with other ethnic groups and kin across the border. But when dealing with local government officials, their ethnic affiliation is strategically downplayed and their national identity as Indonesian citizens is strongly emphasized, although local Iban sentiments first and foremost seem to be placed within their own ethnic community and across the border (Eilenberg 2005).

The Iban relationship with the Indonesian state has been changing throughout history. For example, during the Communist insurgency, Iban allegiance to the state was relatively strong as many Iban men cooperated with the Indonesian military, tracking down Chinese Communists along the border (see Lumenta 2001, 2005). Today, on the other hand, during a time of local economic boom (mostly due to illegal logging), such allegiances appear very weak, characterized by distrust and suspicion. This is a result of opposing interests and government interference in the economic and political freedom of the borderlanders. Sometimes this shifting allegiance takes place with both identities simultaneously professed, a paradox that is vividly expressed in the strategic juggling of identities.

Although switching identities when it seems favorable, most inhabitants in Rumah Manah, especially those with little or no national education, are well aware of, and recognize that they have less in common with their fellow Indonesian citizens of the province than their Sarawak kin across the border. Though living within the borders delimiting the Indonesian nation-state, many borderland Iban, as a consequence of labor migration and ethnic affiliation, have more knowledge of the Sarawak state capital, Kuching, than their own distant provincial capital, Pontianak. (5)

The ambiguous and often contradictory relation the Iban hold with their own nation-state is a consequence of what I will call their special borderland habitus (Eilenberg 2005). I mean habitus in the sense of a longtime presence in the borderland and subsequent adjustment to the special circumstances that prevail here, resulting in the acquiring of special abilities--"a feel for the game." These abilities through time have become embodied into social conventions and local practices, following Pierre Bourdieu: "a durable way of standing, speaking, walking, and thereby feeling and thinking" (Bourdieu 1990:69-70), that is, dispositions and practices that emphasize flexibility, mobility, and pragmatism. In their striving to accumulate capital (economical, social, cultural, and symbolic), as potential capacity to produce and gain benefits, the Iban attempt to access a variety of fields, and this strategy involves the use of multiple identities. Different identities coexist, with each one becoming important depending on the circumstances.

When talking about a borderland habitus, I am in line with the concept of "border identity," as introduced by Wilson and Donnan (1998). They refer to a "border identity" as the special environment that is created and structured by a borderland. Such an identity is a mixture of many different and often contradictory identities that can change rapidly depending on the political and economic situation. Consequently: "Borders are liminal zones in which residents, wayfarers and the state are continually contesting their roles and their nature. As a result borders and border people have identities which are shifting and multiple" (Donnan and Wilson 1999:64). I make use of the notion of a borderland habitus here to explain Iban…