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1776 By David McCullough Simon & Schuster, 400 pages, $32
In 1776, David McCullough tells the story of the first year of the Continental Army and shows that George Washington's victory over the British was far from foreordained. Rather, as McCullough demonstrates, it was the result of America's first long, hard slog.
1776 is not intended as a study of Washington's generalship, though it is his successes and failures that drive the narrative. McCullough follows the Continental Army, from Washington's assumption of command during the siege of the British at Boston, through Washington's defeat in the Battle for New York, and concludes with his legendary victories at Trenton and Princeton.
The siege of Boston has been neglected by historians despite the fact that it was Washington's first test as Commander in Chief. McCullough's account of the siege reveals that Washington was far from a brilliant general. Unlike Napoleon, he did not have an intuitive grasp of military strategy. Washington's original plan at Boston was for frontal assaults on the British defenses, but his War Council consistently and wisely rejected his proposals, remembering what had happened to the British during their frontal assaults at Bunker Hill. Washington's generals proposed occupying Dorchester Heights, the undefended bluffs overlooking Boston from the south. Fortunately, Washington knew good advice when he heard it.
Despite his early weaknesses as a strategic thinker, Washington excelled at logistical operations. Under his direction, his army was able to fortify Dorchester Heights in a single night before the British realized what was going on. The British were then within range of the cannon that Henry Knox had just brought down from Fort Ticonderoga. As a result, the British were faced with either undertaking a frontal assault to remove the Americans or abandoning Boston. They too had no taste for another Bunker Hill, and so evacuated the city. Washington's first campaign thus ended in a great success, not because of his combat leadership but because of his organizational and management skills, especially his personnel decisions.
Throughout 1776, McCullough shows how Washington's officers were cardinal to his effectiveness as a general. Washington had an excellent eye for talent, which could see through superficial defects in men to find their true abilities, and he surrounded himself with exceptionally capable officers. Among the men he selected as his generals were Henry Knox (missing several fingers on his left hand due to a hunting accident) and Nathaniel Greene (who walked with a limp due to a childhood accident). It was Knox who proposed the plan to seize the cannon at Ticonderoga that ultimately proved essential to the victory in Boston. Greene's greatest contribution would occur much later in the war in the South, but his natural talent as a commander in the field ensured ...