Terrorism and national security.(Defence)

THE RECENT SURGE of enthusiasm for the ninetieth anniversary of the Gallipoli landings and the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the European phase of the Second World War has surprised many commentators, upset not a few, and puzzled others like myself who wonder whether Australians will ever devote sustained attention to the strategic dimensions of national security. Even the post-2001 focus upon terrorism and the associated conflict in Iraq tend to be seen in isolation, a phenomenon that will pass away and one to be dealt with in passing.

There is little consideration of the long-term implications or even the interrelationship of military and police commitments to East Timor, the Solomons, Papua New Guinea, tsunami-ravaged Indonesia and the protection of Australia's maritime boundaries. Each is seen in isolation, with no consideration of whether these events have a strategic significance or whether they are simply examples of some unstated "good neighbour" policy with the Australian Defence Force and police deployed as much for their availability as for any unique contribution they can make. Even more, there is little consideration of the nature of the global extent of Australia's fundamental economic and security interests.

Apart from the minor commitments that have been made over a decade and a half since the end of the Cold War, most discussion of national security has revolved around the occasional defence White Papers handed down by the mandarins of the Defence Department and more or less endorsed by the government of the day. Even then, attention has concentrated on the "big ticket" shopping list rather than on whether the resultant defence force is capable of performing not only its likely tasks but also those unpredictable ones that bedevil any security policy.

For some four decades after the end of the Second World War, global, regional and local security strategies were essentially defined by the Cold War and the Western strategy of containment of the Soviet Union and its allies. Containment was formulated by the United States as a strategy in the late 1940s as a response to the communist takeover of Eastern Europe and China. Underlying the strategy, however, was a deeply held conviction that communism as a totalitarian ideology was fundamentally unsustainable and unstable. While the security strategy was predominantly Euro-centric, it had its impacts worldwide as the communist powers sought to expand their ideological worldview and break the shackles of the containment strategy. For all that popular and much intellectual analysis focused upon the potential for all-out nuclear war, the Cold War was more about its avoidance than its potential.

Australia played a limited part in the strategy, most notably through the US alliance and token armed involvements in Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia's "Confrontation" with Malaysia. Australia was also a participant in the ultimately fragile South East Asia Treaty Organisation but, despite the rhetoric, its actual enthusiasm was muted and driven more by a desire to commit the United States to Australia's security. It certainly did not translate into a significant and sustainable Australian military capability.

With the exception of the Vietnam War, most armed conflict in the Cold War era was surrogate warfare of greater or lesser intensity, with both major powers supporting opposing parties in local conflicts while avoiding direct involvement themselves. The weakness of the containment strategy left the initiative to the communist powers, especially the Soviet Union, so that the Western response always looked reactive and frequently reactionary as well.

Containment achieved its objective with the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist governments of Eastern Europe. This was followed almost immediately by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the United Nations' authorisation of the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait by a broad-based but American-led coalition. Debate raged over what many perceived as an American failure to "finish the job" and overthrow the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. Militarily such an objective could certainly have been achieved but it would have resulted in the collapse of the coalition, a further diminution of UN authority and the loss of a potentially valuable New World Order.