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Concepts that are useful in other areas of human rights break down in the context of children. Because children are dependent on adults for their development, they are an anomaly in the liberal legal order, which views negative rights as implying fully rational, autonomous individuals that can exercise free choice. This Article argues for a positive right to protection for children, rooted in dignity, by probing the problematic nature of the positive/negative rights duality and exploring alternate legal approaches to protecting children's rights in both international and comparative law. The adoption of positive rights for children would help assure adequate protection, which the current American legal regime, as typified by the case DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, fails to do.
I. INTRODUCTION
Children are an anomaly in the liberal legal order. Conceptualizations that work in other areas of human rights break down in the context of children. Children defy the conventional view of rights as implying fully rational, autonomous individuals who can exercise free choice and require freedom from governmental interference. Lacking fully developed rational capabilities, children are dependent "incompetents" by definition. Furthermore, unlike the term "individual," the term "child" does not stand alone from all others, but necessarily implies a relationship.
The founders of liberal rights theory perceived children to be outside the scope of their philosophies. John Stuart Mill (1) excluded children from his conception of liberty. He wrote:
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children ... Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury ... Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. (2)