'Betwixt and between': the South African state's search for autonomy in the face of globalisation.

Late-coming involves benefits as well as costs. As one of the latest surfers on the 'Third Wave of Democratisation' South Africa can draw on a much more supportive international environment as it struggles towards democratic consolidation than most of its post-colonial predecessors. At the same time, it is faced with a shift towards an ever-growing diminution of the roles of the state, as liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation become the thin end of the wedge for international agencies. However, the problem of empowering the formerly oppressed African majority seems to make a strong, interventionist, or, for that matter, autonomous state ever more inevitable. How can the state in South Africa cope with these contradictions? The article explores some of these contradictions, argues the need for a transformative consensus and attempts to put the dilemma of the South African state's search for autonomy in the time of globalisation into theoretical and comparative perspective.

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   [T]he process of globalisation inevitably impacts on the 
   sovereignty of states, with states losing some of their 
   sovereignty to an evolving system of international governance. 
   The very mobility of capital and the globalisation of the 
   capital and other markets, make it impossible for countries, 
   for instance, to decide national economic policy without 
   regard to the likely response of these markets. (1) 
 
   The state often appears as a neutral force, above society; 
   but ultimately it is an instrument of the ruling class. 
   In transitional periods, the political rulers may use 
   government power to reshape economic power, for instance 
   through state investment or land reform. In turn, the economic 
   ruling class tries to influence the new political leaders to 
   stop progressive measures. In these circumstances, a bureaucratic 
   bourgeoisie may emerge ... To prevent this requires more 
   accountability for political leadership, and measures to stop 
   people from using the state to enrich themselves. Above all, 
   it needs a strong progressive movement, both inside and outside 
   of government. The public-sector unions, in particular, have a 
   key role in ensuring the transformation of the state. (2) 
 
   Zuma [ANC Deputy President Jacob Zuma] gave a brief lecture on 
   Zimbabwean political economics: President Robert Mugabe's 
   government embarked on a huge social spending spree without 
   analysing social needs, which caused inflation to spiral. 
   'We do not want to follow the same route', said Zuma. 
   'We have a responsibility to more than just the sectarian needs 
   of the union movement. We have to serve the broader population 
   as a whole.' (3) 

All three statements quoted above refer to a commonplace in the political rhetoric of ruling parties and government representatives of our times, namely the postulation of a reduced scope for domestic policy choices due to a decline in state autonomy, and, consequently, state capacity, brought about by the forces and pressures of globalisation, vested interests and the like. At the same time, the two latter statements are a good illustration of the growing tensions within South Africa's ruling tripartite alliance of the African National Congress (ANC), South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Trade union critiques of the government's unconcealed shift to neoliberal policies harden and the gap between the labour movement and civil society on the one hand, and the state and domestic and international capital on the other hand, widens.

Now that the glamour of the political miracle of South Africa's 'negotiated revolution' is wearing off, the task of reconciling one of the world's least egalitarian capitalist systems with the legitimate aspirations of the formerly oppressed African majority has become the Damocles' sword of the country's elusive dawn. The ANC's historical commitment to hard-line socialist principles and policies has long gone with the wind (of globalisation) and has been superseded by elite-struck bargains of neoliberal adjustment. But the debate whether market primacy is capable of social transformation and lessening poverty or whether a strong (interventionist) state is an indispensable prerequisite to overcome the social legacies of apartheid is still highly controversial, with proponents of both views drawing heavily on the putative constraints or resources a globalised world has generated in order to back up their arguments. Will the 'new South Africa' be able to come up with enough careful and imaginative leadership to find a middle way of balancing the state and the market while staying within the limits of the democratic framework? Or will it follow either the path of Zimbabwe--failing to bring about a more egalitarian society and turning into a democratic facade--or that of India--staying democratic but at the price of peaceful stagnation and the rise of an enclave economy. This is probably the most challenging research question political science of and on South Africa is facing at the beginning of the new millennium.

THE PROBLEM STATED

The underlying logic of the dilemma South Africa is facing is the contradiction inherent in the 'double transition' (4) the country is undergoing. The 'double transition' refers to 'states that are simultaneously consolidating democracy and reconstructing their economies', (5) and is a process more and more constituents of the post-colonial, or, for that matter, developing world, are going through.