The effects of forfeiture on third parties.(Canada)

Canada's federal government has recently expanded the scope of its criminal forfeiture legislation to include property that represents proceeds of crime, property that represents instruments of crime, as well as property that is owned or controlled by a terrorist group. Meanwhile, provincial governments in Ontario and Alberta have enacted novel legislation providing for so-called civil forfeiture. These developments suggest that Canadian lawmakers have become increasingly interested in pursuing property, as opposed to people, associated with criminal activity.

This article is concerned with how forfeiture affects the interests of parties who are not suspected of being complicit in the criminal activity that has motivated the forfeiture ("third parties"). Third parties include original owners or transferees of property subject to forfeiture as well as holders of security interests therein. Both the federal and provincial regimes grant judges--and, in some cases, the executive--remarkable amounts of discretion over whether and how to protect the interests of third parties. This article argues that this discretion creates undesirable legal uncertainty. It goes on to suggest ways in which legislation can be reformed, and judicial discretion structured, to ensure that the burden of achieving the public goals that motivate forfeiture does not fall disproportionately upon third parties.

Le gouvernement federal un Canada a recemment etendu la portee de sa legislation sur la confiscation de biens en matiere criminelle pour y inclure notamment les biens issus du crime, les biens ayant servi comme instruments du crime, et les biens possedes ou controles par un groupe terroriste. En parallele, les gouvernements provinciaux de l'Ontario et de l'Alberta ont mis en vigueur de nouvelles lois permettant la soi-disant >. Ces developpements suggerent que les legislateurs canadiens deviennent de plus en plus interesses a pourchasser les biens, plutot que les personnes, associes a l'activite criminelle.

Cet article etudie comment la confiscation des biens peut affecter les interets de parties qui ne sont pas soupconnees de complicite avec l'activite criminelle justifiant la confiscation ( >), ce qui inclut les proprietaires, les titulaires, et les detenteurs d'interets sur les biens faisant l'objet d'une telle mesure. Les regimes provinciaux et federanx accordent tous deux anx juges--et darts certains cas, a l'executif--un large pouvoir discretionnaire quant a la pertinence et la maniere de proteger les interest des tiers. Cet article tend ademontrer que cette discretion cree une incertitude juridique indesirable. L'anteur suggere des avenues par lesquelles la legislation pourrait etre reformee et la discretion judiciaire stucturee, afin d'eviter que l'atteinte des objectifs publics justifiant la confiscation de biens n'impose un fardeau disproporfionne anx tiers.

Introduction

In recent years, law enforcement agencies around the world have become increasingly interested in pursuing property, as opposed to people, associated with criminal activity) Canadian law enforcement agencies are no exception to this trend, as evidenced most recently by the federal government's decision to expand the scope of its forfeiture legislation and the Ontario and Alberta governments' pathbreaking decisions to enact their own legislation providing for so-called civil forfeiture.

There has been considerable debate in Canada and elsewhere about the merits of forfeiture legislation. (2) Much of that debate focusses on the effect of forfeiture on people who have committed, or at least are suspected of committing, criminal activity. This article, however, is concerned with a different topic, namely, the potential impact of forfeiture legislation on parties not suspected of being complicit in (i.e., capable of being charged as parties to) the criminal activity that has motivated the forfeiture ("third parties").