Turkey's reliance on Britain: British political and diplomatic support for Turkey against Soviet Demands, 1943-47.

In general, Turkish foreign policy towards Russia and Britain has been shaped by the geographical position of Turkey rather than political motives. This is because Turkey occupied a geographical location where Russian interests were supreme in the north and lands and seas in which Britain had a great interest in the south and the west. After the beginning of the Ottoman decline in the late seventeenth century, Turkey had always been compelled to look to one of the Great Powers to support her against Russia. Turkey had generally obtained this support either from Britain or Austria-Hungary and later from Germany, but mostly it came from Britain.

Except during the Great War which brought Britain and Turkey into two opposite camps, the traditional British policy was to support Turkey as a barrier against Russian expansion southwards. This was the case when the USSR sought to extend its political and territorial influence at the expense of Turkey in the immediate post-Second World War period. This article seeks to examine and analyse the process of Turkey's reliance on Britain and of the latter's response to the Turkish security pleas during one of the most critical stages in the history of Turkish Republic. As Turkey found itself isolated at the end of the Second World War because of her neutral position during the conflict, she attached utmost importance to the British responses, regarding them as a matter of life and death to herself. This article is based on abundant British archival material as well as available primary and secondary Turkish and American sources.

The historical Turco-Russian antagonism dates back to the late seventeenth century. At this time, the Ottoman Empire was defeated by the European Coalition of Crusades in 1683. This defeat marked the beginning of the Ottoman decline in Europe. In the coming century, as Russia turned into a powerful empire, its Tsarist policy had always been to reach an outlet into the warm waters of the Mediterranean, and Turkey's location posed a great obstacle to this goal. Hence the geographical position of Turkey was the main reason for a long running battle between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. (1)

The conflict between Russia and Turkey continued until the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. After the First World War, as the new Soviet Government and the new Turkish Republic had common cause in opposing the western powers, this brought the two countries into close collaboration from 1920 onwards. However, this 'opportunist friendship' was not free from constant friction. Moscow was not happy with the Straits Convention, which was signed at Lausanne on 24 June 1923. According to this convention, an international commission would be established to control the Straits navigation and the Straits Zone would be demilitarized. (2) Later, the two governments signed a treaty of friendship and neutrality in December 1925. This treaty was extended in 1935 for another ten years until November 1945, with an automatic extension thereafter for periods of two years, subject to six months' prior notice of intent either to renew or to abrogate. It committed each country to abstain from participating in any alliances or coalitions which were directed against the other.

In 1934, as Anglo-Turkish relations improved, the Soviets unofficially raised their demands to obtain bases in the Straits for the first time under the pretext of the growing Italian threat in the Mediterranean. Turkey began to realize the possible Soviet danger at this time and attached more importance to aligning herself with the west, especially with Britain. With British assistance, she regained control of the Straits at Montreux in July 1936. Although the USSR gained tangible advantages by the Montreux Convention she was not fully satisfied. The Convention did not provide complete security on its southern borders because Turkey had obtained effective control of the Straits to allow or hinder the passage of warships. Moscow's fear was that if Turkey aligned herself with a hostile bloc then the security of the USSR would be in danger. (3) Therefore Moscow, from this time onwards, began to pursue a joint defence of the Straits and tried to reach a bilateral agreement with Turkey. The Russians changed their tactics and tried to achieve their traditional aspirations in the Straits by means of a military alliance. However, Turkey rebuffed the Russian attempts to make one, and her relations with the Soviets began to deteriorate. (4)

The Italian invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935 was a major factor which brought Britain and Turkey closer. Maintaining the status quo in the Mediterranean area was the main common factor in Anglo-Turkish policies. According to the British Ambassador to Ankara, Sir Percy Loraine, the development of warmer Anglo-Turkish relations started in 1934 and grew in 1936 and thereafter 'relations with England become the keystone of the arch of the Turkish foreign policy'. (5) Italy's invasion resulted in a major change in the course of Turkish foreign policy. In contrast to his previous policies, Ataturk was now convinced that it was necessary to form a security bloc against any further Italian aggression. (6) In his conversation with Loraine, Ataturk made it plain that Turkey 'most earnestly' and 'definitely' desired Anglo-French co-operation under British leadership for the following reasons: first, a general western settlement; second, preservation of an equilibrium of forces which the Turks understood and can live with; third, to make effective the chances of collective security; fourth, for the continuity of the League idea; last, for Turkey's own security. (7)

In essence, Ataturk's idea was a nucleus for the future treaty of 1939. In 1936, another example of the increasing warmth of Turkish relations with Britain was shown by the remarkable welcome given to King Edward VIII on his unofficial visit to Istanbul in September 1936, and by the awarding of the contract for the Karabuk steelworks to a British firm. (8)