Egyptian investment in the Sudan: 'assistance or exploitation?'.

The Condominium era of Sudanese history, 1899-1956, provides scholars with a unique opportunity to examine the complexities of nationalist movements. Because of prior Egyptian governance of the region, because Egypt financed and provided most of the military support in the reconquest, and because claims of restoring Egyptian control of the Sudan were useful in deflecting European criticism of British expansion in Africa, Egypt and the United Kingdom would share responsibility for administering the Sudan. However, Egyptian leaders maintained that this 'dual control' was a temporary measure masking their rightful sovereignty over the region. The following study is an examination of the Egyptian nationalist movement's aims and activities in the Sudan. During the inter-war period Egyptian nationalists claimed and sought to further develop a multitude of historic, linguistic, religious, and cultural ties with the Sudan. Strong economic ties, firmly binding Egyptian and Sudanese regions, would be the final piece in a formidable case to be laid before British or international diplomats when the sovereignty issue was addressed. Egypt's elite during the 1930s and 1940s increasingly believed that investment in the Sudan was an essential element in the nationalist cause. This article will determine which fields of investment piqued the greatest Egyptian interest, why such activities ultimately failed, and address the question of whether or not success in a specific field of investment would have furthered the general sovereignty objective of the Egyptian nationalist movement.

>From the moment the Condominium agreement was signed in 1899, the prospect of increased Egyptian activities, investment or otherwise, seemed dim, as it was clearly apparent that British officials actually ruled the country. British governors-general administered the Sudan under martial law in the first decades of the new regime. Egypt's limited administrative presence was drastically curtailed in the aftermath of the 1924 murder of Sudanese governor-general and Sirdar of the Egyptian army, Sir Lee Stack. Furthermore, in the inter-war period British officials in the Sudan began a policy of 'native administration' that was designed to rely on Sudanese persons for the performance of administrative duties formerly carried out by Egyptians. Throughout the inter-war period British officials worked to eliminate or diminish both the private and public sector Egyptian presence in the Sudan.

Although British officials had a vice-like grip on the levers of power within the Condominium administration, from the beginning the question of who should ultimately claim sovereignty over the Sudan remained unanswered. Egyptian officials of the early twentieth century were actively pursuing the end of British control of Egypt. However, they also believed their deserved and legitimate state should include the Sudan--and the Condominium agreement had not specifically denied such a merger. Nationalists' interests in the 'Unity of the Nile Valley' were more consistently expressed after the British unilateral declaration of Egyptian independence in 1922 had specifically excluded the Sudan. Egyptian initiatives of the inter-war era focused on strengthening linguistic, religious, educational, and other cultural bonds, especially after the conclusion of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty which allowed greater Egyptian involvement in the Sudan. In lectures, in the local press, and in the chambers of parliament Egypt's elite seized every opportunity to stress the historic cultural unity of the Nile valley. Such cultural connections between Egypt and the Sudan did not damage efforts to obtain eventual sovereignty, but as one scholar of nationalism noted:

 
   the consensus is that cultural nationalism is a regressive force, a 
   product of intellectuals from backward societies, who, when 
   confronted by more scientifically advanced cultures, compensate for 
   feelings of inferiority by retreating into history to claim descent 
   from a once great civilization. Somehow or other, cultural 
   nationalism, it is argued, is functional for the formation of 
   nations in such backward cultures, but in itself cannot shape their 
   path to socio-political modernization. (1) 

Whether aware or not of the 'regressive' nature of cultural nationalist claims, Egypt's elite also began more concerted efforts to develop another, more tangible, bond with their southern neighbours--namely increased economic integration of the Nile valley. Egyptians sought to promote commerce, to encourage landholding in the Sudan, to facilitate transport between the countries, and to entice labour migration to the Sudan. These and other methods, many hoped, would transform the two regions into one economic bloc. The desire for sovereignty in the Sudan was a primary motive of increased Egyptian investment activity. Egyptians consistently noted the connection between investment in Sudanese economic development and the political purposes of such. Muhammad Tawfiq Khashba's statements in Egypt's Chamber of Deputies reflected this opinion. In 1945 this deputy requested that:

 
   We direct all people and the government toward working on the 
   perfection of our economic and financial position in the Sudan. And 
   I appeal to the capitalists among Egyptians to employ their money in 
   various economic spheres in the Sudan. The projects in need of money 
   there are numerous.... [and] the mission of the [Egyptian] economic 
   expert [in the Sudan] is the guidance of money to these projects, 
   whether they are agricultural, industrial or commercial, and by this 
   method we may serve our nation and fulfil our duty in respect to our 
   Sudanese brothers. (2) 

However, the question should be posed whether or not the Egyptians, virtually a 'colonized' people themselves during the inter-war period, were proposing investment in Sudanese development for their own financial benefit or for the betterment of the entire Nile valley--with potentially no 'return' from their efforts. The latter altruistic explanation seems rather doubtful, but Egyptians did consistently disguise personal or national 'profit motives' in a facade of concern for their 'brothers' in the Sudan. Egyptian Minister of Finance Makram Ubayd stated after the conclusion of the 1936 treaty that Egyptian entrepreneurs should recognize their responsibilities in the Sudan and that he hoped to encourage 'their participation in the activities of rebuilding in the Sudan, by means of their money and their efforts'. (3) Makram Ubayd's comments, and others like his, do not imply any exploitative motive behind Egyptian involvement in the Sudan. However, some private individuals did explicitly acknowledge such motivations. For instance, the local merchant/entrepreneur, Salvatore Cicurel, wrote in 1937 that the Egyptian government, in cooperation with the British government, must begin to take specific measures to facilitate 'the exploitation of the natural treasures of the Sudan'. (4) Whether exploitative or not, Egyptians consistently cloaked true motives of their investment initiatives in a guise of promoting the nationalist cause.