How Not to Build a Nation.(Coalition Occupation of Iraq)(Editorial)

When Paul Bremer, the Bush administration's top civilian in Iraq, abruptly reversed course and allowed the Iraqis to set up a "governing council" last week, he wasn't reflecting some conversion on the part of the administration to the merits of "home rule." The decision--a good one, ultimately--had a lot more to do with American forces' failure to improve the woeful state of Iraq's economic and security situations. Unable to do the job ourselves, we really didn't have a choice.

How bad are we Americans at nation-building? As a journalist embedded with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment until last month, I saw it firsthand. It was not the dire reports of Coalition casualties and Iraqi insurgents that I found the most disturbing. The attacks were spread out, the enemy unorganized and ill trained. And most Iraqis I met were ecstatic to be liberated. It was the performance of the American military and civilian command that left me with a deep sense of foreboding for Iraq's future: we lacked even a basic understanding of Iraq and the effects of Saddam Hussein's rule. We suffered from poor or nonexistent coordination and communication--even between Americans. In short, we didn't have a clue.

An example: in Al Qaim, where I spent about five weeks, the locals constantly complained of a lack of gasoline, often citing it as evidence of the U.S. failure to fix things. Local U.S. commanders agonized over how to obtain some--even arranging to send trucks hundreds of miles to try to buy it. Thus it came as quite a shock when they discovered that local gas stations were sitting on top of tens of thousands of gallons. Why hadn't the owners opened? They were waiting for word from Baghdad, and besides, they explained, nobody had asked. Further investigation revealed that the local bank had $80,000 worth of Iraqi dinars in government payroll money, but hadn't thought to issue paychecks--even as people were beginning to run short on food.

Down in Fallujah, locals complained that the schools had not reopened. The schoolmasters wanted instructions from the defunct Ministry of Education. The indecision filtered down to the lives of ordinary people: even today at many military installations, locals wait outside to get a "pass" to travel. When told they don't need one, they often refuse to leave until they are issued one anyway.

Until now, the occupying forces hadn't shown much interest in rebuilding a new center of power in Baghdad to replace the old Soviet- style state. And of course, centralized management is not the only ...