A Nuclear North, All Over Again.(North Korea)

Berger was national-security adviser in the Clinton administration and is chairman of Stonebridge International, a global-strategy firm. GALLUCCI was assistant secretary of State in the Bush and Clinton administrations and is dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

The impression of deja vu all over again is irresistible. It was exactly a decade ago that North Korea got caught cheating by International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, with the help of American intelligence. It had lied about how much plutonium it had produced in the 1980s. The North then threw out the inspectors, announced it was pulling out of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and made some bellicose noises. The United States responded by threatening U.N. sanctions, but also by going to the negotiating table, and staying there, off and on, for 16 months. The only condition for talks was that the North allow inspectors to return to ensure that no more plutonium was separated while we talked. The result was the Agreed Framework of 1994 that effectively stopped the North's plutonium program, one that would otherwise have produced enough material by now for about 100 nuclear weapons. Today's world would be far more dangerous had the framework not been in place.

Last October we learned that once again American intelligence caught the North cheating--the goal this time was not plutonium but highly enriched uranium. As before, the inspectors were thrown out, the North said it was pulling out of the NPT, and it has again resorted to saber rattling.

The similarities between the two nuclear confrontations are striking-- but so are the strategic differences. First, this time North Korea admits it has a secret uranium-enrichment program, and claims it already has some nuclear weapons. Second, over the last 10 years Pyongyang has deployed medium-range missiles that can reach Japan, and is closer to producing longer-range missiles that would reach the United States. Third, many in South Korea now believe the United States is as responsible for the standoff as the North. And finally, among the North's newest threats was reportedly the suggestion that it might consider selling nuclear weapons to the highest bidder.

What should Washington do this time? Sanctions are always appealing when dealing with rogue nations because they do not require talks, they involve direct action without the risks of military action and they can have broad multilateral appeal. Unfortunately, sanctions will not force Pyongyang to give up its nukes because China will not allow the North to be driven to the brink of collapse.

The only option more attractive than sanctions is one or another version of a "free ...