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Contemporary Jewish historiography has tended to deal disproportionately with Jews at the ends of the various spectra of Jewish identity--that is, the most assimilated and the most insular, the most and least religiously traditional, and the most and least nationalistic. Examining the actions and beliefs of these clusters of Jews, to be sure, is a vital component in understanding the experience of European Jewry, not least of all because they played a decisive role in the transformation of European Jewry. No less important, however, are the experiences of the majority of European Jews, who articulated no ideology to justify their beliefs and actions, who may or may not have joined one or more movements for any number of pragmatic or ideological reasons, and who steered clear of extreme responses to the challenges of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, preferring instead to pick and choose between a growing array of possibilities rather than to champion one and impugn the rest.
Such amorphous groups of Jews were present in every country in Europe but are often hard to identify. It is perhaps ironic that one of the most striking of these expressions of nonextremism appeared in Hungary. Ironic because the conventional image of Hungarian Jewry is of religious polarization, epitomized by the schism into Orthodox and Neolog camps in 1868. Often overlooked amid the drama of this schism are those Jewish communities who allied themselves with neither camp but remained somewhere in the middle, with one foot in the world of tradition and the other in the changing world of the nineteenth century. Amid the most vociferous interdenominational strife, they were more clearly identifiable in Hungary than anywhere else in Europe in a movement that celebrated their right not to choose, the Status Quo Ante movement.
At first glance, the Status Quo movement appears a minority movement of middling importance. According to a survey of Hungarian Jewish communities conducted in 1896, out of 549 parent communities and 1,531 subsidiaries, only 76 and 171 of them, respectively, joined the Status Quo movement, whereas 179 parent communities and 359 subsidiaries were affiliated with Neology and 294 and 1,001, respectively, with Orthodoxy. Between 1880 and 1910, when statistical records are available, 38-43 percent of Hungarian Jewry belonged to the Neolog movement, 51-56 percent to Orthodoxy, and only 5-6 percent to the Status Quo. Moreover, whereas both the Neolog and Orthodox movements could claim much larger regional majorities, Status Quo communities were scattered across the kingdom, with no apparent pattern of distribution. (1)
From an ideological standpoint, the Status Quo movement appears to be little more than a melange of communities and congregations drawn randomly from across a wide spectrum of religious observance with no apparent coherence. There was no Status Quo prayer book, no platforms or conferences, no pithy slogans, and the first gathering of Status Quo affiliates did not take place until 1928. This hodgepodge appearance of communities and congregations complicates the task of analyzing the movement. Unlike Neology and Orthodoxy, Status Quo communities eschewed supercommunal organization, which was often the reason they had refused to join one of the other camps; thus, there was no central organizing body or overt ideology for Status Quo. As a result, whereas the larger movements have been analyzed statistically and qualitatively, historians have generally treated the Status Quo movement as an afterthought to the schism between Orthodoxy and Neology, downplaying the Status Quo as an inconvenience that flies in the face of what historians often cite as a paradigm of polarization between traditionalists and progressives.
Pro-Orthodox historians, in particular, have been quick to minimize the importance of the Status Quo by pointing out that many Hasidic communities that had opted for Status Quo over Orthodoxy in 1869 had joined the Orthodox camp by 1880. The remaining communities, historians such as Yekutiel Greenwald asserted, were largely an aberration, a collection of communities and congregations that, though traditional enough to eschew Neology, lacked the ideological fortitude to join with Orthodoxy:
Indeed, from the day that a community would be known as Status Quo ... from that day their hands became weakened--as ultimately they were Holy Israel--and when the time came to decide whether to affiliate with the Reform party or the Orthodox party, they would have chosen the "fearers," but since they had a choice to sit on their hands--sit and not act--many chose to sit and not act, thinking that in this way they doing Torah. And when even some great sages remained with those who sat and did not act, then the great men of the generation decided to wage war against the Status Quo with all means and might. (2)
When we look beyond the size of the movement and its adduced lack of ideological fortitude, and when we examine it within the broader context of nineteenth-century Hungarian-Jewish history, we find greater significance. The impulse to join the Status Quo movement reflected a mentality that was far more prevalent within Hungarian Jewry than any membership list indicates. The beginnings of this mentality were already detectable during the first half of the nineteenth century and were rooted in a broad array of demographic, institutional, and political factors. This mentality was present not only among communities that eventually affiliated with Status Quo but also among scores of others that wavered before joining Orthodoxy or Neology, in some cases for a decade or more. These once-uncommitted communities and congregations, even after affiliating with one of the other movements, overlapped substantially with those affiliated with the Status Quo, and they are thus essential in understanding the mentality behind it.