American Philosophical Quarterly articles from April 1995

American Philosophical Quarterly archives from April 1995

Are coerced acts free?
April 1, 1995... After a busy day of Christmas shopping, Anne walks back to her apartment through the hustle and bustle of the city streets. As she moves through the crowd, a ringing sound grows increasingly louder until she spies a volunteer, clad in the...

Indeterminism and control.
April 1, 1995... Free will has often been taken to be not only compatible with determinism but positively dependent upon it. According to such a view, the freedom of the will with which an agent acts is diminished to the extent to which her action is not...

Non-intentional actions.
April 1, 1995... There is no doubt that there is such a thing as intentional action, which is the bringing about of events by agents who have reasons for bringing them about, and whose performance of the actions of bringing about those events are explained by...

Does the theological fatalism rest on an equivocation?
April 1, 1995... Theological fatalism is the position that (libertarianly) free agency is incompatible with the existence of an everlasting and essentially omniscient being.(1) The classic argument for this conclusion begins with the supposition that an...

Pre-existence, survival, and sufficient reason.
April 1, 1995... I If we decline to consider any possible support from religion or from parapsychology, does either pre-existence or survival remain a rationally defensible hypothesis? I suggest we may answer that each does so, provided that some credence be...

The choice-intention principle.
April 1, 1995... Philosophical principles can be advocated for different reasons. Some principles are asserted because they are initially or intuitively plausible. Others are not initially plausible but are advocated in place of those which are because the...

Moral experience and the internalist argument against moral realism.
April 1, 1995... A number of anti-realists(1) have argued that moral realism(2) is untenable because it cannot adequately account for the reason-giving status of moral beliefs. The claim is that the putative objectivity of moral facts would prevent them from...

Philosophical anarchism and legal indifference.
April 1, 1995... Consider the following two theses: (Philosophical anarchism) There is no reason to obey the law as such.(1) (Legal indifference) Obedience to law is as much in need of justification as disobedience to law is. It is sometimes held that...